intended that a duty to make public the terms of a proposed
@
collective bargaining agreement be placed upon certified employee
organizations, it could have done so specifically. It has been
held by the Iowa Supreme Court, "[iln seeking the meaning of a law
the entire act should be considered and each section construed with
the act as a whole and all parts thereof construed together.^^
"All parts of the statute are considered together, without giving
undue importance to a single or isolated part. "'
An examination of
Section 20.21 of the Act reveals a legislative ability to impose
an af finnative duty to "make public. "I0 The legislature's failure
to impose a similar duty on certified employee organizations in
Section 20.17(4) indicates its intention not to do so.
Looking beyond the language used in the Act and examining the
purpose for which the legislation was enacted, I reach the same
conclusion. A determination of "what is the main objective of the
. . . Act . . . is made by reference to the prior state of the
law, other circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment,
consideration of statements of public policy found within the act,
'1n re Estate of Bliven, 236 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Iowa 1975).
'1owa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Miller, 312 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa
1981) (quoting Osborne v. Edison, 211 N.W.2d 696, 697 (Iowa
1973).
10 Section 20.21 imposes an affirmative duty on the Board to
make the fact-finder's report public if a dispute between
a public employer and the employee organization continues
ten days after the report is submitted.
