In American Laundry Machine Co., the NLRB ruled that the
employer did not refuse to bargain by granting a cost-of-living
increase during negotiations, since a bona fide impasse on wages
existed at the time the increase was granted. In that case, the
NLRB stated:
"The Union's continued insistence upon, and
the employers steadfast refusal to grant, a
wage increase higher than the one proposed
by the Respondent on August 16, all of which
we find occurred in the general course of
negotiations, convince us that a bona fide
impasse on wages existed on September 12,
and accordingly, we conclude that the wage
increase granted on September 17, neither
violated the Act per se nor was evidence of
bad faith bargaining." 2/
In a public sector case involving the same type of issue, the
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the employer did not breach his
duty to bargain by enacting an ordinance imposing residency require-
ments on police officers, since the Union and the employer had negoti-
ated to impasse on the issue. In that case, the Court declared:
"Under the NLRA, when good faith bargaining
has reached an impasse, the employer may take
unilateral action on an issue if that action
is consistent with the terms of its final offer
to the union. The duty to bargain, however,
does not terminate. It is merely suspended and
again becomes viable with a change in the sur-
rounding conditions or circumstances.... The
concept of unilateral action after impasse is
also recognized in the public sector. The
public sector has, however, begun to institute
procedures such as fact-finding and arbitration
that require parties to negotiate after impasse." 3/
In the instant case, it is apparent that a clear disagreement
still remains between the parties at the conclusion of mediation on
April 29. The record indicates no intention by either party to move
from its position in bargaining. There were no requests by either
2/ American Laundry Machine Co., 33 LRRM 1457 (1954).
2/ Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit (Michigan
Supreme Court, No. 54411). 85 LRRM 2536 (1974).
